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JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD
Kent McNeil*

I. INTRODUCTION
After the so-called ‘discovery’ of the Americas by Christopher Columbus
in 1492, the dominant powers of Europe participated in a competitive rush
for colonies that eventually encompassed most of the world. The initial
preeminence of Spain and Portugal in this colonial enterprise was later
overtaken by the ascent of France and Great Britain, with Britain emerging
as the dominant empire-builder at the end of the Seven-Years War in
1763. After World War II, this process was reversed by the decolonization
of much of Asia and Africa, where former colonies became independent
and joined the international community as nation-states. In other parts of
the world, colonies generally known as ‘settler colonies’ also achieved
independence. In these former colonies, European settlers had arrived and
reproduced in such numbers that they became the majority of the
population. Achievement of nation-state status by these colonies did not
result in restoration of the independence of the Indigenous peoples who
lived there when the Europeans arrived. Instead, the European settlers
remained in control after asserting independence from their mother
country. In some cases, this was the result of unilateral assertion, as
occurred when the Thirteen Colonies in British North America rebelled in
the 1770s and created the United States of America. In other instances,
there was a gradual evolution from colonial status to independent nationstate: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are the leading examples from
the British Empire.1

*
1

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada.
See generally WR Louis (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire, 5 vols
(Oxford University Press, 1998-1999); A Calder, Revolutionary Empire: The
Rise of the English-Speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s
(rev’d ed, Pimlico, 1998); JH Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and
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Transformation of settler colonies into settler states therefore did
not mean decolonization for Indigenous peoples. They continued to be
subjected to the domination of the Europeans who had come to their
territories.2 Politically, the settlers claimed sovereignty, externally against
other nation-states and internally over the territory and people of the settler
state. They exercised this sovereignty – and continue to do so today –
through government institutions that were modeled on, or adapted from,
the European institutions to which they were accustomed.3 Canada,
Australia and New Zealand accordingly remained parliamentary
monarchies, whereas the United States, in keeping with its rejection of
British aristocratic traditions, opted for a republican form of government.
Given their historical foundations, geographical extent, and regional
diversity, Canada, Australia and the United States also chose federal
systems of government, whereby sovereignty is divided internally between
a central government (that also exercises external sovereignty) and various
states or provinces. However, only the United States acknowledged the
internal sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples – the Indian tribes or
nations – living within its borders.4 Canada, Australia and New Zealand all
relied on the British constitutional doctrines of unity of the Crown and
parliamentary sovereignty to deny official acknowledgment of even the
internal sovereignty of their Indigenous peoples. Only recently have
cracks begun to appear in this colonial edifice, as Indigenous peoples in
Canada in particular have asserted their inherent right of self-government

2
3

4

Spain in America 1492-1830 (Yale University Press, 2006). On the
independence of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, see KC Wheare, The
Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (3rd ed, Oxford University Press,
1947).
See chapters by Jennifer Clarke, Jacinta Ruru and Mark Walters.
However, the drafters of the American Constitution were also influenced by
Indigenous forms of government, particularly that of the Haudenosaunee
(Iroquois Confederacy): see DA Grinde Jr, The Iroquois and the Founding of the
American Nation (Indian Historian Press, 1977); BE Johansen, Forgotten
Founders: Benjamin Franklin, the Iroquois and the Rationale for the American
Revolution (Gambit, 1982); DA Grinde Jr and BE Johansen, Exemplar of
Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy (American Indian
Studies Center, University of California, 1991).
See Benjamin J Richardson’s chapter on US Indian Law. For judicial
affirmation, see Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831); Worcester
v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832); US v Lara, 541 US 193 (2004).
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and obtained begrudging, limited acceptance of this right from the
Canadian state.5
European legal systems – including the law of nations (now
international law) developed in Europe to regulate relations among nationstates – distinguish between sovereignty and property rights. Sovereignty
involves the exercise of governmental authority over a territory by a polity
that asserts and maintains (in principle, if not always in practice) its
independence. Externally, sovereignty includes the capacity to enter into
relations with other polities that exercise sovereignty over other territories.
Internally, it can be equated with jurisdiction, or the authority to make and
enforce laws and government policies. Property rights, on the other hand,
involve rights in relation to things (corporeal and incorporeal), including
land, that arise under and are regulated by domestic laws that generally
originate from either practice (customary law) or enactment (positive law).
This distinction is vitally important in colonial contexts because
acquisition of sovereignty by a colonizing European power did not
necessarily entail acquisition of proprietary land rights.6
When the European colonizers arrived in North America, they
claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis other European powers. But they also
entered into treaties with Indigenous nations, some of which
acknowledged the sovereignty of those nations.7 Other North American
treaties involved acquisition of property rights in land, and so were
admissions by the Europeans that the Indigenous peoples had such rights.8
Similarly in New Zealand, by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi the British
Crown acknowledged the pre-existing sovereignty (at least in the Māori

5

6

7

8

See Shin Imai’s chapter, and K McNeil, ‘Judicial Approaches to SelfGovernment since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence’ in H Foster, H
Raven and J Webber (eds), Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder
Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (UBC Press, 2007) 129.
See M de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law, trans of
1758 edn by CG Fenwick (Carnegie Institution, 1916) bk I, c 18, ss 204-5; K
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (Stevens and Sons, 1966) 99,
625-36.
Eg the Two-Row-Wampum Treaty with the Haudenosaunee: see M Mitchell,
‘An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty’ in B Richardson (ed), Drumbeat:
Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Summerhill Press, 1989) 107, 109-11.
See also RA Williams Jr, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty
Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 (Oxford University Press, 1997).
See Mark Walters’ chapter.
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version of the Treaty) and land rights of the Māori.9 Nonetheless, the
British Crown claimed that its own acquisition of sovereignty over a
territory included underlying title to all the land, and courts have
consistently upheld this claim.10 The same rule has been applied in
Australia, where no treaties have been acknowledged and there was no
judicial recognition of Indigenous land rights (apart from statute) until
1992.11
This chapter focuses on the common law land rights of the
Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. These former settler colonies share a common British heritage,
and all have legal systems that are based on English law. Despite these
commonalities, the law in relation to Indigenous land rights has developed
in distinctive ways in each of these jurisdictions. The connection between
land rights and Indigenous sovereignty has also been dealt with
differently. As already mentioned, American law recognized early on that
land rights and internal sovereignty are both aspects of Indigenous
territorial rights, while the other three jurisdictions have been reluctant to
acknowledge this connection.
The discussion is structured thematically rather than
geographically. Topics covered are the sources, content and proof of
Indigenous land rights, and the ways in which they can be extinguished
and infringed. The focus is on judicial treatment of these matters, rather
than on legislation and negotiated agreements.12 Comparisons of the law in
9

10

11

12

See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter, and C Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen and
Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1987); P McHugh, The Māori Magna Carta: New
Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 1991); M
Belgrave, M Kawharu and D Williams (eds), Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives
on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 2005).
See St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1888) 14 App
Cas 46 (PC); Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010; Te Runanga
o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23-24 (CA);
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).
By Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (HC Aust). For evidence of
an unacknowledged treaty in Tasmania, see H Reynolds, Fate of a Free People:
A Radical Re-Examination of the Tasmanian Wars (Penguin Books, 1995). On
statutory land rights, which will not be dealt with here, see Jennifer Clarke’s
chapter.
For statutory and agreement-based rights, see chapters by Jennifer Clarke, Shin
Imai, Benjamin J Richardson and Jacinta Ruru. Resolution of land claims is
dealt with in Michael Coyle’s chapter.
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the four jurisdictions under consideration are undertaken in relation to
each of the topics covered. While this comparative analysis is meant to be
critical, it nonetheless examines these matters from the perspective of the
dominant legal system in each jurisdiction, which is based on English
common law. I realize that this involves making a choice of law. This is
not intended to reflect negatively on the relevance or validity of
Indigenous legal systems.13 Instead, it is an acknowledgement of the
limitations of my own knowledge and expertise as a non-Indigenous
academic, and of the fact that, with the exception of tribal and peacemaker
courts in the United States, the law of Indigenous rights has been
formulated and applied primarily by common law courts.

II. SOURCES OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
While the existence of Indigenous land rights has long been acknowledged
by governments and courts in the United States, Canada and New Zealand,
and more recently in Australia, the sources of these rights have not always
been clear. One possibility is that these rights arise from the Indigenous
legal systems that were in place when the European colonizers arrived.
According to established principles of British colonial and international
law, when the Crown acquired sovereignty over a territory the land rights
of the local peoples under their own systems of law continued, and became
enforceable in common law courts, through what is known as the doctrine
of continuity.14 A second possibility is that the common law itself
acknowledged that use and occupation of land by Indigenous peoples at
the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty gave rise to real property

13

14

See chapters by John Borrows and Christine Zuni Cruz, and Borrows’ book,
Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (University of Toronto
Press, 2002).
See M Walters, ‘The “Golden Thread” of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at
Common Law and under the Constitution Act, 1982’ (1999) 44 McGill Law
Journal 711; RL Barsh, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Lex Loci in British Imperial
Law’
in
K
Wilkins
(ed),
Advancing
Aboriginal
Claims:
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich Publishing, 2004) 91; Vattel, above n 6, bk
III, c 13, ss 200-1; PD O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1967) vol I, 237-50.
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rights.15 This alternative should be available to any Indigenous occupants,
whether or not they had land rights under their own pre-existing systems
of law.16 Thirdly, Indigenous land rights may have been based on the law
of nations, as applied by domestic courts. A fourth possibility is that
Indigenous land rights arose after Crown acquisition of sovereignty,
through a positive act of creation by the Crown or a legislative body.17
In North America, the British Crown purchased Indigenous lands
by treaty, a practice that was formalized by the Royal Proclamation of
1763.18 In its decision in St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v
The Queen19 in 1888, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
suggested that the Royal Proclamation was the source of Indigenous land
rights in British North America, but in 1973 the Supreme Court of Canada
in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia20 decided that this was
not the sole source. Justice Judson put it this way:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British
Columbia cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of
1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians
were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as
their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian
title means….21
While this passage indicated that occupation of land can be a source of
Indigenous land rights, the words ‘organized in societies’ implied a further
requirement.22
The notion that any people could exist without being socially
organized attracted considerable criticism,23 and was notably absent from
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23

See K McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Clarendon Press, 1989) esp 196221.
Ibid, 193-96.
A fifth potential source not discussed here is natural law or fundamental
principles of justice: see B Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial
Claims’ (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 681.
See Mark Walters’ chapter.
Above n 10.
[1973] SCR 313.
Ibid, 328.
See Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs [1980] 1 FC 518 (FCTD), 557.
Eg see C Bell and M Asch, ‘Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent
in Aboriginal Rights Litigation’ in M Asch (ed), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in
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the Supreme Court’s subsequent reassessment of Aboriginal title in
Delgamuukw v British Columbia.24 Chief Justice Lamer stated:
It had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal
title in Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see St.
Catherine's Milling. However, it is now clear that although
aboriginal title was recognized by the Proclamation, it
arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal
peoples.25
He went on to explain that there are two ways in which prior occupation is
relevant. First, in the common law physical occupation is proof of
possession, which in turn grounds title. He thus accepted the second
potential source we identified earlier.26 But he also suggested another
‘source for aboriginal title – the relationship between common law and
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law’.27 However, he does not seem to
have meant by this that Aboriginal title is derived from Aboriginal law and
the application of the doctrine of continuity. Instead, when elaborating on
proof of Aboriginal title, he clarified that both physical occupation and
Aboriginal law can be relied upon to establish the exclusive occupation at
the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty that is necessary to prove title.
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, he regarded Aboriginal title
as a generic right that does not vary from one Aboriginal group to another,
as it would if it were based on the continuation of rights under vastly
different systems of Aboriginal law.28 However, it is nonetheless
conceivable that the Chief Justice meant to leave the door open for
Indigenous peoples to claim title on the basis of their own laws, as an
alternative to occupation-based title.

24
25
26

27
28

Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (UBC Press,
1997) 38.
Above n 10.
Ibid, para 114.
In R v Marshall; R v Bernard [2005] 2 SCR 220, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty is the source of
Aboriginal title. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia [2008] 1 CNLR
112 (BCSC).
Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 114.
See B Slattery, ‘A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights’ in Foster, Raven and
Webber, above n 5, 111.
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The Canadian Supreme Court has distinguished Aboriginal title
from more limited Aboriginal rights to harvest resources – such as fish,
game and timber for domestic use – from specific lands.29 These rights
stem, not from exclusive occupation of land, but from practices, customs
and traditions in relation to harvesting that were integral to distinctive
Aboriginal cultures at the time of contact with Europeans30 (or, for the
Métis, effective European control31). In this context, customs can include
Aboriginal law,32 but the Supreme Court has not applied the doctrine of
continuity as such in identifying and enforcing these land rights.33
Turning to the United States, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
existence of Aboriginal or Indian title early in the 19th century.34 In the
famous case of Johnson v M’Intosh,35 Chief Justice Marshall regarded
occupation as the basis for this title, but not in the way the Canadian
Supreme Court did later in Delgamuukw. Instead of applying the common
law property rule that physical occupation of land is proof of possession
and title, Marshall CJ relied on his understanding of the doctrine of
discovery in the law of nations.36 He explained that, on discovering North
29
30

31

32
33

34
35

36

Eg see R v Adams [1996] 3 SCR 101; R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139; R v Sappier;
R v Gray [2006] 2 SCR 686.
R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507. For critical commentary, see J Borrows,
‘Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster’ (1997) 22
American Indian Law Review 37; RL Barsh and JY Henderson, ‘The Supreme
Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand’ (1997) 42
McGill Law Journal 993; CC Cheng, ‘Touring the Museum: A Comment on R. v
Van der Peet’ (1997) 55 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 419.
R v Powley [2003] 2 SCR 207. The Métis, who originated as a distinct people
from intermarriage between Aboriginal women and European fur-traders, are
one of the three Aboriginal peoples (Indians and Inuit are the others) whose
Aboriginal rights were recognized and affirmed by s 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See PLAH
Chartrand (ed), Who Are Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples? Recognition, Definition,
and Jurisdiction (Purich Publishing, 2002).
See Sappier and Gray, above n 29, para 45.
For critical analysis, see K McNeil and D Yarrow, ‘Has Constitutional
Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?’ (2007)
37 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 177, esp 204-11.
See Fletcher v Peck, 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), 142-43.
21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). For detailed background and analysis, see LG
Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed
Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (Oxford University Press, 2005).
See RJ Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson,
Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny (Praeger Publishers, 2006).
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America, the major European states all wanted to acquire as much of it as
they could, but, to reduce conflicts among themselves, they all agreed ‘that
discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession’.37 As a result, the pre-existing
sovereignty and land rights of the Indian nations were reduced:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it.38
Indian title thus became a right of occupancy through application of what
Marshall CJ considered to be an international principle, which he applied
domestically. Indian law was not the source of this title, though in his view
this law continued to apply internally within the Indian territories.39
Marshall CJ’s reliance on the law of nations rather than on the
common law of property or Indigenous law reveals a fundamental
difference between the United States and Canada. In American law, Indian
title is not just a proprietary right to land. It really amounts to title to
territory, which includes governmental authority as well as land rights. So
the Indian nations have retained residual sovereignty over their territories
37

38
39

Johnson, above n 35, 573. Marshall CJ undoubtedly got this wrong, as there was
no agreement among European nations during the colonial period on the
requirements for obtaining territorial sovereignty in the Americas: see MF
Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in
International Law (Longmans, Green and Co, 1926); J Goebel Jr, The Struggle
for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (1927,
reissued Kennikat Press, 1971), 47-119; P Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in
European Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge University Press,
1995); B Slattery, ‘Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English
Ventures in North America’ in J McLaren, AR Buck and NE Wright (eds),
Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (UBC Press,
2005) 50.
Johnson, above n 35, 574.
Ibid, 593. See also the cases cited in n 4 above.
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as ‘domestic dependent nations’ within the United States.40 In Canada,
land rights and self-government have been treated as separate issues by the
Supreme Court,41 though we shall see later that Aboriginal title does have
jurisdictional dimensions that have been acknowledged by the British
Columbia Supreme Court.42
In Australia and New Zealand, Indigenous law has played a more
prominent role as a source of Aboriginal title to land. Prior to the High
Court’s decision in Mabo v Queensland [No 2],43 the sole judiciallyacknowledged source of Indigenous land rights in Australia was
legislation, enacted in the Northern Territory and most states to address
the denial of land rights in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty.44 In Mabo, the Court
reassessed this matter, and concluded that the Indigenous peoples of
Australia did indeed have native title (the Australian term for Indigenous
land rights) to lands they occupied under their traditional laws and
customs at the time the British Crown acquired sovereignty. Applying this
conclusion to the Miriam People of the Murray Islands in the Torres Strait,
the Court declared that they ‘are entitled as against the whole world to
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray
Islands’.45
Although there was no evidence of the communal title that the
Court apparently declared the Miriam People to have,46 in his judgment
40
41

42
43

44

45
46

Cherokee Nation, above n 4, 17. See also Worcester, above n 4.
See Delgamuukw, above n 10; R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821. Compare
Mitchell v MNR [2001] 1 SCR 911, per Binnie J, and discussion in McNeil,
above n 5, 143-52. For critical analysis, see K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Rights in
Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty’ (1998) 5 Tulsa Journal
of Comparative and International Law 253, reprinted in K McNeil, Emerging
Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Native Law
Centre of Canada, 2001) 58.
In Campbell v British Columbia [2000] 4 CNLR 1.
Above n 11. For background and analysis, see PH Russell, Recognizing
Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler
Colonialism (University of Toronto Press, 2005).
(1971) 17 FLR 141 (NTSC). See McNeil, above n 15, 290-97; H McRae et al
(eds), Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, Lawbook
Co, 2003) 184-86, 204-30.
Mabo, above n 11, Order of the Court, 217.
Moynihan J, the judge who made the factual findings, had ‘found that there was
apparently no concept of public or general community ownership among the
people of Murray Island, all the land on Murray Island being regarded as
belonging to individuals or groups’: ibid, 22.
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Justice Brennan included the following general statement about the source
of native title that has become entrenched in Australian law:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional
customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a
territory.47
Despite the evident contradiction between this statement and the absence
of traditional laws and customs supporting the communal title declared by
the Court,48 the Australian Parliament adopted Brennan J’s statement in
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth),49 which was enacted to validate preexisting, non-Indigenous land rights and provide a mechanism for
resolution of native title claims. Section 223(1) of that Act provides:
223. (1) The expression ‘native title’ or ‘native title rights
and interests’ means the communal, group or individual
rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait
Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
(a)

the rights and interests are possessed under the
traditional laws acknowledged, and the
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders,
by those laws and customs, have a connection
with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the
common law of Australia.

47
48

49

Ibid, 58.
See K McNeil, ‘The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the
Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law’ in Emerging Justice?,
above n 41, 416, 418-22.
Amended by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) and the Native Title
Amendment Act 2007 (Cth). For detailed discussion, see McRae, above n 44,
esp 247-376; RH Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (2nd ed, LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2004).
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In subsequent judgments, the High Court has relied upon this statutory
definition, and required strict proof of Indigenous laws and customs
supporting claimed land rights at the time of Crown acquisition of
sovereignty, as well as proof that these laws and customs have been
maintained up to the present day.50
In New Zealand, Māori land rights were acknowledged by the
British Crown in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, the English version of
which guaranteed to the Māori ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other
properties’.51 Judicial acknowledgement followed soon after, in the 1847
decision of the NZ Supreme Court in the Queen v Symonds.52 In Nireaha
Tamaki v Baker,53 the Privy Council approved of the Symonds decision,
and rejected a contrary opinion expressed by another New Zealand judge
that ‘there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of Law
can take cognizance’.54 On the contrary, the Privy Council said that the
statutory regime put in place to integrate Māori title into the English
landholding system ‘plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land
under custom and usage’.55 This view that Māori land rights have their
source in Māori custom and usage (tikanga Māori) has recently been
affirmed by the NZ Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa.56

50

51
52
53
54
55
56

Eg see Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 128; Commonwealth v Yarmirr
[2001] 208 CLR 1; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; Members of
the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. For critical
analysis, see L Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases Since
Mabo (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2006); S Dorsett, ‘An Australian Comparison
on Native Title to the Foreshore and Seabed’ in C Charters and A Erueti (eds),
Māori Property Rights in the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier
(Victoria University Press, 2007) 59; S Young, The Trouble with Tradition:
Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 2008).
Art 2. The Treaty is reproduced in the First Schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi
Act, NZS 1975, No 114. For detailed analysis, see works cited above in n 9.
[1840-1932] NZPCC 387.
[1901] AC 561.
Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC
72.
Nireaha Tamaki, above n 53, 577.
Above n 10. See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter.
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The doctrine of continuity has thus been applied in New Zealand,
but less rigidly than in Australia.57 Māori land rights are sourced, not just
in traditional laws and customs, but also in practice and usage, rendering
bright-line distinctions between law/custom and practice/usage
unnecessary.58 This approach also avoids the problem that Indigenous
claimants have faced in Australia of having to prove that they had a
normative system prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty that generated
‘rights’ cognizable to non-Indigenous Australian judges.59

III. CONTENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
Indigenous land rights are sui generis – they are different from other
interests in land under the common law. There are also variations in the
nature of these rights in each of the four jurisdictions under consideration
here. These variations are largely due to the different sources of these
rights examined in the previous section. The content of land rights rooted
in occupation and use is not the same as content stemming from traditional
laws and customs. The right of occupancy of the Indian nations in the
United States also has unique features arising from American
constitutionalism and the US Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine
of discovery.
In Canada, we have seen that the Supreme Court held in
Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title arises from exclusive occupation of land
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. At common law, exclusive
occupation usually results in a fee simple estate, which, apart from Crown
title, is the largest permissible interest in land.60 However, given its
unique source in occupation pre-dating Crown sovereignty, and other sui
generis aspects (such as inalienability and communal nature, to be
discussed below), the Court declined to equate Aboriginal title with a fee
simple estate. But despite arguments by counsel for the Crown, the Court
57

58
59
60

See Young, above n 50, esp 167-200. For recent application of this doctrine in
another common law jurisdiction, see Cal v Attorney General of Belize; Coy v
Attorney General of Belize, Claim Nos 171 and 172 of 2007, SC of Belize.
See K McNeil, ‘Legal Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Māori Claims to the
Foreshore and Seabed’ in Charters and Erueti, above n 50, 83, esp 87-89.
See Yorta Yorta, above n 50. For critical analysis, see McNeil, above n 48;
Young, above n 50.
See McNeil, above n 15, 6-9, 198.
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also refused to limit Aboriginal title to traditional uses. Chief Justice
Lamer stated:
I have arrived at the conclusion that the content of
aboriginal title can be summarized by two propositions:
first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive
use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for
a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those
aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are
integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that
those protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the
nature of the group's attachment to that land.61
This means that Aboriginal title includes the natural resources on and
under the land, including standing timber and oil and gas, regardless of
whether the Aboriginal titleholders used these resources in the past.62 It
also means that they have the right to prevent third parties from
trespassing on their land.63
Chief Justice Lamer’s second proposition placed an inherent limit
on the uses Aboriginal titleholders can make of their lands that was
intended to preserve the land for future generations. Elaborating, he said
that ‘lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be
irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and the
relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together
have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place’.64 As examples of
situations where this limit might apply, he suggested that Aboriginal
titleholders might not be able to strip-mine their traditional hunting
grounds or convert a ceremonial site into a parking lot.
Although well-intentioned, the inherent limit the Court placed on
uses of Aboriginal title land was without precedent, and could seriously
impede beneficial economic development by Aboriginal communities. It is
also paternalistic, shifting authority to protect Aboriginal lands from
61
62
63
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Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 117.
Ibid, para 119-24; Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 26, para 971-81.
See K McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90’s: Has the Supreme Court
Finally Got It Right? (Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University,
1998) 8-11.
Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 128.
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communities to Canadian judges.65 Given the long history of exploitation
of Aboriginal lands and removal of natural resources for the benefit of
colonial interests, one has to wonder who is better placed to ensure the
protection of these lands for future generations.66
In addition to this inherent limit and Aboriginal title’s unique
source in occupation prior to Crown sovereignty, Chief Justice Lamer
identified two further sui generis aspects: inalienability and communal
nature.67 In each of the four jurisdictions under consideration, courts have
consistently held that Aboriginal title cannot be sold or otherwise
transferred to anyone other than the Crown, or, in the United States, the
American government.68 This is a matter of both law and policy.69
Various reasons have been given for this inalienability, including
protection of Indigenous peoples from exploitation, incapacity of private
persons to acquire title other than by government grant, and a need for
government control of settlement. While each of these explanations has
some validity, I think a more fundamental reason is that, unlike private
property interests, Aboriginal title has jurisdictional dimensions that
cannot be transferred to private persons, and so only another government
can acquire the title.70
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court took a distinctly propriety
approach to Aboriginal title, without explicitly considering its
jurisdictional dimensions. Although the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en
peoples who brought the action had asked the Court for a declaration of
their right of self-government as well as of their title, the Court regarded
self-government as a separate matter, and decided not to deal with it
directly.71 Significantly, however, in reference to the communal nature of
Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer observed:
65
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For critical discussion, see K McNeil, ‘The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and
Content of Aboriginal Title’ in Emerging Justice?, above n 41, 102, 116-22.
See Benjamin J Richardson’s Environmental Governance chapter.
See McNeil, above note 15, 221-35; McNeil, above n 65, 122-35.
Eg see Johnson, above n 35; Symonds, above n 52; Mabo, above n 11.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibited private purchases of Indian lands in
British North America, and the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi affirmed the Crown’s
right of pre-emption of Māori lands in New Zealand: see chapters by Mark
Walters and Jacinta Ruru.
See K McNeil, ‘Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title’
(2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 473.
Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 170-71.
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Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal
persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members
of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land
are also made by that community.72
In addition to attributing legal personality to Aboriginal nations,73 this
brief passage does contain an indirect acknowledgement of the
jurisdictional dimensions of Aboriginal title. As recognized by Justice
Williamson of the BC Supreme Court in Campbell v British Columbia,74
where title is held communally by an Aboriginal group that has decisionmaking authority, there must be a political structure for exercising that
authority. In other words, communal title and decision-making authority
necessitate self-government, at least in relation to Aboriginal title land.75
Before discussing the other three jurisdictions, mention needs to be
made of the content of Aboriginal land rights in Canada apart from title. In
a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that Aboriginal peoples
can have site-specific rights to harvest resources, even though they do not
have title to the land itself.76 In Sappier and Gray,77 for example, the
Court held that the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq peoples in New Brunswick have
an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes, such as
constructing houses and making furniture for themselves. The content of
these resource-use rights is determined by practices, customs and
traditions that were integral to the distinctive culture of the people in
question at the time of contact with Europeans.78
Turning to the United States, the Supreme Court’s approach to
Aboriginal title has never been strictly proprietary. Ever since Johnson v
M’Intosh79 was decided in 1823, Indian title has been inseparable from
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Ibid, para 115.
This is an exception to the common law rule that unincorporated collectivities
are not legal persons and so cannot hold property: see McNeil, above n 65, 12225.
Above n 42, para 137-38.
See McNeil, above n 5, 139-43.
See cases cited above in n 29, and K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal
Rights: What's the Connection?’ (1997) 36 Alberta Law Review 117.
Above n 29.
See Van der Peet, above n 30, and the articles cited in that note.
Above n 35.

2008]

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS

17

Indian sovereignty. In the two Cherokee Nation cases in the early 1830s,80
Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that, after European colonization and
subsequent incorporation of their territories into the United States, the
Indian nations retained not only their lands, but also their internal
sovereignty. Indian title therefore has jurisdictional dimensions that make
it more akin to title to territory than to title to land: Indian nations exercise
jurisdiction over their tribal lands in the same way other sovereigns
exercise jurisdiction over lands within their territories.81 It follows that
Indian nations have a plenary, collective interest in their lands that
includes all surface and subsurface rights.82 Moreover, in exercising their
sovereignty they can make laws providing for the creation of individual
and other property rights within their territories, but the restriction on
alienation mentioned above prevents them from selling their lands so that
they would be removed from their territory and hence their jurisdiction,
unless the purchaser is the United States.83 Furthermore, unlike Aboriginal
title in Canada, Indian title is not subject to an inherent limit restricting the
uses Indian nations can make of their lands.
The US Supreme Court’s jurisdictional approach to Indian land
rights has had a down-side for the Indian nations. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v
80
81

82

83

Cherokee Nation and Worcester, above n 4. See J Norgren, The Cherokee
Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1996).
See V Deloria Jr and CM Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty (Pantheon Books, 1984); DE Wilkins and KT
Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law
(University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); C Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise
of Modern Indian Nations (WW Norton, 2005); NB Duthu, American Indians
and the Law (Viking Penguin, 2008).
See US v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US 111, 115-18 (1938); US v Klamath and
Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119, 122-23 (1938); Otoe and Missouria Tribe v US,
131 F Supp 265, 290-91 (1955), cert denied 350 US 848 (1955); US v Northern
Paiute Nation, 393 F 2d 786, 796 (1968); US ex rel Chunie v Ringrose, 788 F 2d
638, 642 (1986).
However, from 1887 to 1934, the General Allotment Act, 24 US Stat 388,
allowed for creation and sale of individual allotments and distribution of
‘surplus’ Indian land to homesteaders: see DS Otis, The Dawes Act and the
Allotment of Indian Land, edited by FP Prucha (University of Oklahoma Press,
1973); FP Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and
the Indian, 1865-1900 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1976) 227-64; CF
Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
Constitutional Democracy (Yale University Press, 1987) 8-9, 19-20; and
Benjamin J Richardson’s chapter on US Indian Law.
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United States,84 the Court held that Indian title that has not been
legislatively or executively recognized by the United States is not a
property right compensable under the Fifth Amendment to the American
Constitution.85 Instead, it is a mere ‘right of occupancy [that] may be
terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself [the
United States] without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate
the Indians’.86 Although this decision has been justifiably criticized,87 the
jurisdictional dimensions of Indian title and the political nature of the
relationship between the Indian nations and the United States may help to
explain it.88 Justice Reed, in his majority judgment, remarked that the TeeHit-Ton claim ‘was more a claim of sovereignty than of ownership’.89 As
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, sovereignty is distinct from
property, and numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have held that
Indian sovereignty is subject to the plenary power of Congress.90
Nonetheless, it is more in keeping with the territorial nature of Indian
rights, and with earlier American case law, to regard these rights as both
jurisdictional and proprietary.91
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348 US 272 (1955).
1 US Stat 21. The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84, 279.
Eg see JY Henderson, ‘Unraveling the Riddle of Indian Title’ (1977) 5
American Indian Law Review 75; NJ Newton, ‘At the Whim of the Sovereign:
Aboriginal Title Reconsidered’ (1980) 31 Hastings Law Journal 1215; SJ
Bloxham, ‘Aboriginal Title, Alaskan Native Property Rights, and the Case of the
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians’ (1980) 8 American Indian Law Review 299.
See McNeil, above n 15, 259-67. For a political analysis of the decision, see K
McNeil, ‘How the New Deal Became a Raw Deal for Native Americans: The
Tee-Hit-Ton Alaska Decision and the Denial of Fifth Amendment Protection to
Indian Land Title’, paper delivered at the Western History Association’s 40th
Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, October 11-14, 2000 (on file with
author).
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84, 287.
Eg see Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, 187 US 553 (1903); US v Wheeler, 435 US 313,
323 (1978); Cotton Petroleum Corporation v New Mexico, 490 US 163, 192
(1989); South Dakota v Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 US 329, 343 (1998). For
critical commentary, see V Deloria Jr, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An
Indian Declaration of Independence (University of Texas Press, 1985) 141-60;
Wilkins and Lomawaima, above n 81, 98-116. See also the concurring judgment
of Thomas J in Lara, above n 4, questioning the plenary power doctrine.
See text accompanying n 35-40 above.
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In Australia, reliance on traditional laws and customs and the
doctrine of continuity has had a very negative impact on Indigenous land
rights.92 Contrary to the all-encompassing native title of the Miriam People
declared by the High Court in Mabo, in subsequent cases Indigenous
claimants have had to prove rights in relation to land by reference to
specific laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty.
The content of their rights is therefore defined by their laws and customs.93
So even if they were in exclusive occupation of land at that time, they
would not, for example, have any rights to minerals if they did not have
laws and customs in relation to those resources.94
Post-Mabo, the High Court has thus taken a particularized
approach to native title, treating it as a divisible bundle of rights, each
arising from specific laws or customs. As a result, a right to take estuarine
crocodiles is as much a native title right as a right to exclusive
possession.95 So Australian law contains no equivalent to the fundamental
Canadian distinction between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal land
rights. Moreover, the High Court has adamantly refused to envisage
continuation of rights other than in relation to land. The doctrine of
continuity has therefore been applied selectively, eliminating the
possibility of an Indigenous right of self-government.96 On the positive
side, this means that native title rights and interests can co-exist with nonexclusive third party interests, such as some pastoral leaseholds, though in
the event of conflict the third party interests generally prevail.97
While the doctrine of continuity has also been applied in New
Zealand, it has not had the negative impact seen in Australia. This is
mainly because Māori land rights are based on tikanga Māori,
encompassing both custom and usage.98 Rights that were not otherwise
92
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For detailed discussion, see McNeil, above n 48; Strelein, above n 50; Young,
above n 50.
See esp Ward and Yorta Yorta, above n 50.
Ward, above n 50, esp para 382.
Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258 (HC Aust).
See Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45; Coe v Commonwealth
(1993), 68 ALJR 110; Thorpe v Commonwealth [No 3] (1997) 71 ALJR 767;
Yorta Yorta, above n 50.
See Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129 (HC Aust); K McNeil, ‘CoExistence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in Land in Australia and
Canada’ [1997] 3 Canadian Native Law Reporter 1. Compare Anderson v
Wilson (2002) 213 CLR 401 (HC Aust).
See text accompanying n 57-58 above.
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extinguished have mostly been converted into common law interests by
the Native Land Court (now the Māori Land Court).99 But as recently
affirmed by the NZ Court of Appeal, Māori land rights based on tikanga
Māori can still exist, usually as exclusive interests equivalent to fee simple
estates, or, less commonly, as more limited interests.100 Although the
matter has not yet been conclusively decided, it appears that exclusive
Māori interests include rights to standing timber and mineral resources, a
conclusion that follows from their equivalence to fee simple.101

IV. PROOF OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
When Indigenous peoples seek judicial acknowledgment of their land
rights in the courts of the nation-states that have asserted sovereignty over
them, they have the onus of proving their rights in accordance with tests
and standards that are usually set by the judiciary.102 These tests and
standards vary from one jurisdiction to another, depending on the source
of the title and other factors, but the burden of proof is always onerous.
The difficulties Indigenous claimants face are compounded by the fact that
their traditions were generally oral, and courts tend to place greater weight
on written documents in determining historical issues arising beyond the
limits of living memory.
The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged these difficulties,
and has sought to alleviate them to some extent by directing trial judges to
admit oral histories as evidence and to accord them appropriate weight. In
Delgamuukw, for example, the Court overturned the trial judge’s decision
and ordered a new trial, in part because he had not given sufficient
credence or weight to the oral histories of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en
99
100
101
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See DV Williams, ‘Te Kooti Tango Whenua’: The Native Land Court 18641909 (Huia Publishers, 1999), and Jacinta Ruru’s chapter.
See Ngati Apa, above n 10, esp per Elias CJ, para 46; Young, above n 50, 167200.
See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA);
Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA), per
Cooke P, 527-30; and discussion in Young, above n 50, 180-82.
For critical analysis in the Canadian context, see K McNeil, ‘The Onus of Proof
of Aboriginal Title’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 775, reprinted in
Emerging Justice?, above n 41, 136.
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claimants. After acknowledging that the hearsay rule, for example, could
act as a barrier to the use of oral histories in court, Chief Justice Lamer
stated that ‘the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of
evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the
types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely
consists of historical documents’.103 Nonetheless, judges still retain
considerable discretion regarding the weight to be given to any evidence,
including oral histories.104 Moreover, in Australia there appears to be an
on-going tendency to give more weight to the written evidence of settlers
than to the oral histories of Indigenous peoples.105
What Indigenous peoples actually have to prove to establish their
land rights depends largely on the source of these rights. In Canada,
where Aboriginal title is based on occupation, Aboriginal peoples have to
prove that they were in exclusive occupation of the claimed land at the
time of British assertion of sovereignty.106 As discussed earlier, the
requisite occupation can be established by proof of physical presence and
use of the land, and by evidence of Aboriginal law. In Delgamuukw, Chief
Justice Lamer explained:
... the source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both
in the common law and in the aboriginal perspective on
land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems
103
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Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 87. See also Van der Peet, above n 30, para 68;
Mitchell, above n 41, para 27-39; Benoit v Canada [2003] 3 CNLR 20 (FCA),
leave to appeal refused, SCC, 29 April 2004. For discussion, see J Borrows,
‘Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Traditions’ (2001) 39 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal 1.
Mitchell, above n 41, para 36.
Eg see Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998]
FCA 1606, aff’d [2001] 110 FCR 244, (2002) 214 CLR 422. Compare De Rose
v South Australia [No 1] [2002] FCA 1342, rev’d on other grounds (2003) 133
FCR 325 (Full FC), and Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402, where
oral histories figured more prominently. In the United States, the Indian Claims
Commission, though given a broad mandate that included authority to hear and
determine ‘claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity’ (Indian Claims Commission
Act of 1946, 60 Stat 1049, s 2: see Michael Coyle’s chapter), generally regarded
oral histories as too vague and self-serving to be relied upon: eg see Pueblo of
Taos v US, 15 ICC 688, 694-95 (1965). For commentary, see G Stohr, ‘The
Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law’ (1999) 31 Arizona State Law
Journal 679.
Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 144.
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of law. It follows that both should be taken into account in
establishing the proof of occupancy. 107
Regarding physical occupation, Lamer CJ said it ‘may be established in a
variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through
cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land
for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources’.108 Factors to
consider in deciding whether the occupation was sufficient to establish
title include ‘the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and
technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed’.109
Somewhat surprisingly, when the Supreme Court next considered
proof of Aboriginal title in R v Marshall; R v Bernard,110 Chief Justice
McLachlin emphasized the importance of physical occupation, and
virtually ignored the evidentiary role of Aboriginal law. She also seems to
have raised the threshold for establishing occupation by deciding that
proof of occupation of specific sites rather than of a broader territory is
required.111 She suggested as well that nomadic peoples may not have
been in sufficient occupation of at least some of their territories to have
title. In contrast, Justice LeBel (Fish J concurring), in a separate judgment
concurring in result, thought the Chief Justice’s physical occupation
approach was ‘too narrowly focused on common law concepts relating to
property interests’, and might preclude establishment of Aboriginal title by
nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples.112 Moreover, in his trial decision in the
Tsilhqot’in Nation case in 2007, Justice Vickers of the BC Supreme Court
found that Marshall and Bernard differed from the claim before him
because in that case ‘the persons accused both attempted to prove
Aboriginal title at specific sites’ to defend themselves against charges of
violations of provincial forestry legislation,113 whereas in the Tsilhqot’in
107
108
109
110
111

112
113

Ibid, para 147.
Ibid, para 149.
Ibid, quoting B Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights’ (1987) 66 Canadian
Bar Review 727, 758.
Above n 26. For critical commentary, see K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title and the
Supreme Court: What’s Happening?’ (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law Review 281.
Compare the more territorial approach taken by Cromwell JA of the NSCA and
Daigle JA of the NBCA: R v Marshall (2003) 218 NSR (2d) 78, esp para 183; R
v Bernard (2003) 262 NBR (2d) 1, esp para 85.
Marshall and Bernard, above n 26, para 110, 126.
In Marshall and Bernard, ibid, para 142-43, LeBel J also expressed reservations
over deciding Aboriginal title in a quasi-criminal prosecution. See S Imai, ‘The
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claim for a declaration of Aboriginal title the evidence ranged ‘over tracts
of land’.114
Marshall and Bernard also addressed the requirement that the
occupation be exclusive. After noting that factual evidence of acts of
exclusion might not be available, Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that
evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to establish
aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration of
effective control of the land by the group, from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have
excluded others had it chosen to do so.115
In connection with exclusivity, in Delgamuukw the Court briefly
addressed another issue, namely, whether two or more Aboriginal groups
can have joint title if they occupied land to the exclusion of other
Aboriginal groups. Chief Justice Lamer suggested that shared exclusivity
could result in joint Aboriginal title,116 as recognized by the US Supreme
Court in United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad.117 While this issue has
not, as far as I know, received further judicial consideration in Canada,
several American decisions have acknowledged that joint title can exist
where two or more Indian nations amicably occupied land to the exclusion
of other Indian nations.118
As discussed earlier, Canadian law distinguishes between
Aboriginal title and other land rights, which generally involve rights to
harvest particular resources from specific lands. Proof of the latter
involves meeting the test created by the Supreme Court in the Van der

114
115
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Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a
Proposal by Justice LeBel’ (2006) 55 University of New Brunswick Law Journal
146.
Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 26, para 582.
Marshall and Bernard, above n 26, para 65.
Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 158.
314 US 339 (1941).
See Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v US, 195 Ct Cl 365, 394-96 (1971);
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v US, 490 F 2d 935, 944 (1974, Ct
Cl); US v Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383, 1394-95 (1975, Ct Cl);
Strong v US, 518 F 2d 556, 561-62 (1975, Ct Cl), cert denied 423 US 1015
(1975); Uintah Ute Indians v US, 28 Fed Cl 768, 785, 787 n 21 (1993). For
discussion, see MJ Kaplan, ‘Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to
Indian Lands’ (1979, updated 2003) LEXSEE 41 ALR Fed 425, heading 3b,
‘“Exclusive” use or occupancy; joint aboriginal title’.
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Peet decision: Aboriginal claimants must show that the activity they claim
a right over was ‘an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to
[their] distinctive culture’ at the time of European contact119 or, for the
Métis, effective European control.120 Applying this test in 2006 in Sappier
and Gray, Justice Bastarache said that ‘[f]lexibility is important when
engaging in the Van der Peet analysis because the object is to provide
cultural security and continuity for the particular aboriginal society’.121
Regarding the ‘integral to the distinctive culture’ aspect of the test, he
clarified:
What is meant by ‘culture’ is really an inquiry into the precontact way of life of a particular aboriginal community,
including their means of survival, their socialization
methods, their legal systems, and, potentially, their trading
habits. The use of the word ‘distinctive’ as a qualifier is
meant to incorporate an element of aboriginal specificity.
However, ‘distinctive’ does not mean ‘distinct’, and the
notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to ‘racialized
stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples’.122
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Supreme Court accordingly
held that the Pabineau and Woodstock First Nations of the Mi’kmaq and
Maliseet peoples have an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic
uses on Crown lands traditionally used by them for that purpose.
In the United States, there is no equivalent to the distinction
between Indian title and other Indian land rights found in Aboriginal rights
law in Canada.123 The explanation appears to be that American courts have
defined occupation more broadly, so that virtually any Indian use of lands
can give rise to Aboriginal or Indian title.124 As early as 1835, Justice
Baldwin expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court that Indian
119
120
121
122

123
124

Van der Peet, above n 30, para 46, 73.
Powley, above n 31.
Sappier and Gray, above n 29, para 33.
Ibid, para 45, quoting J Borrows and LI Rotman, ‘The Sui Generis Nature of
Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?’ (1997) 36 Alberta Law Review
9, 36.
While Indian resource rights can exist off their lands in the United States, this is
usually the result of treaties: see Duthu, above n 81, 99-109.
See FS Cohen, ‘Original Indian Title’ (1947) 32 Minnesota Law Review 28.
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occupation ‘was considered with reference to their habits and modes of
life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the
cleared fields of the whites, and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in
their own way and for their own purposes were as much respected’.125 So
while Indian title, like Aboriginal title in Canada, is based on exclusive
occupation, American courts have taken a distinctly territorial approach to
its geographical extent. In Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, Justice Douglas
said:
If it were established as a fact that the lands in question
were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the
Walapais in the sense that they constituted definable
territory occupied exclusively by the Walapais (as
distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes),
then the Walapais had ‘Indian title’.126
The same territorial approach has been taken in other American
cases, including decisions of the Court of Claims on appeals from the
Indian Claims Commission, which had been established in 1946 to resolve
outstanding Indian claims against the US government.127 Even tribes
described as ‘nomadic’ have been held to have Indian title to lands they
used on a regular basis in accordance were their own ways of life.128
Moreover, title extends to ‘seasonal or hunting areas over which the
Indians had control even though those areas were only used
intermittently’.129
Another important distinction between Canadian and American
law in relation to proof is that Indian claimants in the United States do not
have to prove occupation of land at the time of British, or even American,
125
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(University of New Mexico Press, 1985), and Michael Coyle’s chapter.
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assertion of sovereignty. Instead, proof of occupation ‘for a long time’ is
sufficient.130 In Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon v United States, Justice Durfee explained:
The time requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a
specific number of years. It must be long enough to have
allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic
territory [so that the court is not] ‘creating aboriginal title in
a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few
years before’.131
This means that Indian nations could acquire title from one another
(especially if by peaceful transfer) or by occupying vacant lands after
American assertion of sovereignty,132 and eases the burden of proof by
shortening the timeframe for establishing the requisite occupation.133
Finally, while American courts have held that the occupation
required for Indian title is a matter of fact,134 what has to be established is
not so much physical occupation as control of territory. In United States v
Seminole Indians of Florida, Justice Collins said that
the Government leans far too heavily in the direction of
equating ‘occupancy’ (or capacity to occupy) with actual
possession, whereas the key to Indian title lies in evaluating
the manner of land-use over a period of time. Physical
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Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v US, 161 Ct Cl 189, 202, 205-7
(1963), cert denied 375 US 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation, above n 129, 194; US v Pueblo of San Ildefonso, above n
118, 1394; Seneca Nation of Indians v New York, 206 F Supp 2d 448, 503 (2002,
WDNY).
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, above n 129, 194.
quoting Sac and Fox Tribe, above n 130, 206.
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, above n 118.
In US v Seminole Indians of Florida, 180 Ct Cl 375 (1967), 58 years was held to
be a sufficiently long time to acquire title. In Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v US, 28
Fed Cl 95 (1993), 30 years sufficed.
See Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, above n 117, 345, quoted in text accompanying n
126 above; Pueblo of San Ildefonso, above n 118, 1394; Six Nations v US, 173
Ct Cl 899 at 910 (1965).
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control or dominion over the land is the dispositive
criterion.135
Proof of native title in Australia is another matter entirely. What is
required is not evidence of exclusive occupation or control, but rather of a
connection to the land through traditional laws and customs.136 This
requirement originated from Justice Brennan’s judgment in Mabo.137 As
we have seen, it was given statutory force by incorporation into the
definition of native title in section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993,138
which, as interpreted by the High Court, makes it necessary for claimants
to prove that they have maintained a connection with the land through
substantially uninterrupted acknowledgement and observance of their laws
and customs from the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty to the
present.139 This requirement make proof of native title especially difficult
for Indigenous peoples in more populated areas whose connection to the
land and observance of traditional laws and customs have been severely
interfered with by settlers. Particularly disturbing is the pronouncement by
the Full Federal Court in 2008 that the cause of loss of connection and
observance is irrelevant.140 Apparently, even illegal squatting – a
historically common way of taking Indigenous land in Australia – could
have resulted in loss of native title because it would have severed the
necessary connection with the land.
The Australian High Court’s approach to native title claims also
necessitates proof of specific laws and customs relating to particular uses
of lands and resources.141 It is not enough for claimants to establish they
had, and have maintained, a general system of traditional laws and
135
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Seminole Indians of Florida, above n 133, 385-86 (emphasis in original).
See Ward, above n 50, esp para 89-93.
Mabo, above n 11, esp 58-60.
See text accompanying n 49-50 above.
Yorta Yorta, above n 50. See also De Rose [No 1], above n 105 (Full FC); De
Rose v South Australia [No 2] (2005) 145 FCR 290; Northern Territory v
Alyawarr (2005) 145 FCR 442; Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63.
Bodney v Bennell, above n 139, para 96-97, relying on Yorta Yorta, above n 50,
para 89-90.
See esp Ward, above n 50. For application of the High Court’s approach, see
Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666; Sampi v Western Australia [2005]
FCA 777; Rubibi Community (No 7) v Western Australia [2006] FCA 459; Risk
v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404, aff’d (2007) 240 ALR 75 (Full FC).
Compare Neowarra, above n 105.
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customs in relation to land; instead, they have to prove that their laws and
customs provide specific ‘rights’ that are recognizable as such by common
law courts.142 So, unlike in Canada where historical practices alone can
generate rights, Australian law requires proof that practices were engaged
in pursuant to traditional laws and customs.143 Moreover, as mentioned
previously, in Australia proof of exclusive occupation does not necessarily
result in all-inclusive rights to surface and subsurface resources.144
While New Zealand has also based Māori land rights on preexisting laws and customs, this has not had the negative consequences that
reliance on traditional laws and customs has had in Australia. This is
because Māori land rights are more broadly grounded in tikanga Māori,
which includes both custom and usage.145 Proof of Māori land rights
therefore involves proof of custom or usage in relation to the claimed land
at the time of British assertion of sovereignty in 1840. If the claimant
group proves exclusive occupation, they have title equivalent to an
inalienable fee simple estate, whereas proof of customary rights or uses
not amounting to exclusive occupation could result in more limited
interests.146 Moreover, unlike in Australia, it does not appear to be
necessary in New Zealand to prove continuous observance of tikanga
Māori from the time of British assertion of sovereignty to the present.147
As in Canada, where title has been established as of that time, apparently it
is presumed to continue until shown to have been extinguished.148
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For detailed discussion and criticism, see Young, above n 50.
See Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 (NSWCA); Derschaw v Sutton
(1996) 90 A Crim R 9 (Full SCWA); Dillon v Davies (1998) 156 ALR 142 (SC
Tas). For discussion, see McNeil, above n 48, 454-58; Dorsett, above n 50 at 6166; Young, above n 50, 338-42; A Erueti, ‘The Recognition of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights to Traditional Lands: The Evaluation of States by International
Treaty Bodies’ in Charters and Erueti, above n 50, 175, 178-83.
Ward, above n 50, esp para 382.
This is a statutory as well as common law approach: Kauwaeranga Judgment,
Native Land Court, 1870, reproduced (1984) 14 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review 227; Ngati Apa, above n 10. See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter.
See text accompanying n 98-101 above.
See Young, above n 50, 172-75.
See K McNeil, ‘Continuity of Aboriginal Rights’, in Wilkins, above n 14, 127.
However, the New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s 50(1)(b), created
a statutory exception: see McNeil, above n 58, 92-93, 103-16; Dorsett, above n
50, 74-77; Erueti, above n 143, 186-87.
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V. EXTINGUISHMENT AND INFRINGEMENT OF
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
In all four jurisdictions considered in this chapter, Indigenous land rights
can be voluntarily surrendered by means of a treaty or other agreement. In
British North America, this was specified in the Royal Proclamation of
1763, which forbid private acquisition of Indian lands and stipulated that
they could only be acquired by the Crown or a proprietary government at a
public assembly of the Indian titleholders gathered for that purpose.149 The
Proclamation continued the pre-existing Crown practice of purchasing
Indian lands, resulting in land-surrender treaties in what is now Canada
from 1763 to the 1920s, when the Canadian government stopped
negotiating treaties. The process recommenced in the 1970s when,
following the Supreme Court of Canada’s acknowledgment of the
existence of Aboriginal title in Calder,150 Canada established the
comprehensive claims process.151 In the 1990s, a similar process was
created in British Columbia when the BC Treaty Commission was set up
to facilitate the negotiation of land claims in that province.152
Extinguishment of Aboriginal title by treaty or other agreement is
controversial. Regarding the Canadian historical treaties, questions remain
regarding interpretation of the land-surrender provisions, and what the
Aboriginal parties understood those provisions to mean.153 In the Prairie
Provinces, for example, it has often been contended that the land was to be
shared, and that only surface rights to the depth of a plow were being
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See Mark Walters’ chapter.
Above n 20.
See Michael Coyle’s chapter.
See C McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating a Mutually
Beneficial Future (UBC Press, 1996); A Woolford, Between Justice and
Certainty: Treaty Making in British Columbia (UBC Press, 2005); T Penikett,
Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty Making in British Columbia (Douglas and
McIntyre, 2006).
See Re Paulette (1973) 42 DLR (3d) 8 (NWTSC), rev’d on other grounds (1975)
63 DLR (3d) 1 (NWTCA), [1977] 2 SCR 628; P Macklem, ‘The Impact of
Treaty 9 on Natural Resource Development in Northern Ontario’ in Asch, above
n 23, 97; S Imai, ‘Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The “Tracts Taken Up”
Provision’ (2001) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 1.
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accorded to the government for the purpose of farming.154 Questions have
also been raised over whether Aboriginal peoples had the authority under
their own systems of law to alienate their lands.155 In the modern-day
treaty process, extinguishment of rights has been vigorously opposed by
Aboriginal peoples, and compromises have been sought to affirm existing
rights while meeting government demands for certainty.156
In the United States, the federal government continued the British
policy of acquiring Indian lands by purchase, though often by applying
coercion, especially during the 19th century removal period when many
eastern tribes were moved from their homelands to Indian Territory in
what later became the State of Oklahoma.157 Congress also has the
authority to extinguish or infringe Indian title unilaterally, without any
legal obligation to pay compensation unless the United States had
previously recognized the title by treaty, agreement or unilateral
government action.158 The states, however, have no such authority, as the
Commerce Clause in the American Constitution gives Congress exclusive
jurisdiction over Indian affairs, and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts,
dating from the 1790s, prohibit state acquisition of Indian lands.159 In the
154
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See Treaty 7 Elders et al, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7
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2000) esp 34-47.
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(McClelland and Stewart, 1986) 243, 247; Canada, Report of the Royal
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(Supply and Services Canada, 1996) 459; S Venne, ‘Understanding Treaty 6: An
Indigenous Perspective’ in Asch, above n 23, 173, esp 192-93.
See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 2, above n 155,
527-57; M Asch and N Zlotkin, ‘Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for
Comprehensive Claims Negotiations’ in Asch, above n 23, 208; and works cited
in n 152 above.
See FP Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years (Harvard
University Press, 1962); RN Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era
(University of Oklahoma Press, 1975); MD Green, The Politics of Indian
Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (University of Nebraska
Press, 1982).
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84. See also Kaplan, above n 118, heading III,
‘Extinguishing aboriginal title’.
Originally 1 US Stat 137 (1790). See County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation,
470 US 226 (1985); RN Clinton and MT Hotopp, ‘Judicial Enforcement of the
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past, the United States could also extinguish Indian title by conquest,160
though more commonly military force was used to compel Indian tribes to
cede their lands to the government.161
In theory, British common law restrictions on the authority of the
Crown would have prevented the taking of Indigenous lands by conquest
in Canada, Australia and New Zealand after Crown acquisition of
sovereignty. In practice, however, legal constraints are not always
effective: in Australia, Aboriginal peoples were often killed or driven from
their lands by force, whereas in New Zealand the wars of the 1860s
resulted in substantial loss of life and land.162 Because Indigenous land
rights were not acknowledged (apart from statute) in Australia prior to the
Mabo decision in 1992,163 no recognized land-surrender treaties or
agreements were entered into there. The Treaty of Waitangi in New
Zealand confirmed rather than extinguished Māori land rights, though
large areas of Māori land have been lost through conversion of those rights
to common law interests and subsequent alienations.164
In the absence of constitutional protections for Indigenous land
rights, there are no domestic legal impediments to extinguishment or
infringement of those rights by legislatures that have constitutional
authority over them.165 Legislative extinguishment has occurred relatively
recently in Australia and New Zealand. By the Native Title Act 1993 (as
amended),166 the Australian Parliament validated some past acts, such as
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(Auckland University Press, 1987); M King, The Pelican History of New
Zealand (Penguin Books, 2003), 211-24.
Above n 11.
See Orange, above n 9, 80-85; McHugh, above n 9, 333-34.
See K McNeil, ‘Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties,
Legislation and Judicial Discretion’ (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa Law Review 301,
esp 317-27.
Above n 49.
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Crown grants of land, so that they extinguished or infringed native title
rights.167 In 2004, the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Foreshore and
Seabed Act, extinguishing most Māori rights to coastal lands below the
high-water mark.168
It is, however, essential to distinguish between legislative and
executive authority. In parliamentary systems of government established
on the British model, the executive branch of government has no authority
apart from statute to take away or infringe property rights.169 As
Indigenous land rights in Canada, Australia and New Zealand are
proprietary, it should be unconstitutional for the executive branch to
extinguish or infringe them without clear and plain statutory authority.
While this appears to be the law in Canada and New Zealand,170 in
Australia the High Court has held that, prior to enactment of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth),171 native title could be extinguished
executively by inconsistent Crown grant or Crown appropriation of the
land for its own use, apparently without clear and plain statutory authority
to do so.172 Moreover, no compensation needed to be paid for this
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See McRae, above n 44, 341-45; Bartlett, above n 49, 392-402. However, s
51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution (s 9 of the Commonwealth of Australia
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University Press, 1998) 13-14, 54-55.
Re Canada, see Calder, above n 20, 402 (Hall J, dissenting on the deciding
issue); Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, 376; R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR
1075, 1099; Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 113, 180; and discussion in McNeil,
above n 165, 311-16. Re New Zealand, see Nireaha Tamaki, above n 53.
This Act of Parliament provides legislative protection against discriminatory
actions by the states that would extinguish native title rights: Mabo v
Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186 (HC Aust). The Native Title Act 1993
provides further protection because valid Commonwealth legislation prevails,
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legislation: Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 128 ALR 1 (HC Aust).
See also Ward, above n 50.
Mabo, above n 11; Fejo, above n 50.
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unilateral taking.173 As both the taking and the denial of compensation are
inconsistent with fundamental common law principles,174 it appears that
the High Court was driven by political considerations to favour the
property rights and economic interests of non-Indigenous Australians over
the pre-existing land rights of the Indigenous peoples.175
In Canada, Aboriginal land rights have two additional
constitutional protections that prevent even legislative extinguishment and
infringement in some instances. First, section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, placed ‘Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians’, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.176 As a result, the
Supreme Court has held that the provinces have lacked the constitutional
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title ever since Confederation in
1867.177 While this should mean that the provinces also lack the authority
to infringe Aboriginal title,178 the Supreme Court has suggested otherwise,
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Mabo, above n 11, 15. The requirement in s 51(xxxi) of the Australian
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(1998) 61 Saskatchewan Law Review 431, reprinted in Emerging Justice?,
above n 41, 249; K Wilkins, ‘Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights’ (1999) 22
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without adequately explaining how provincial legislatures can infringe
rights that are within the core of the exclusive jurisdiction of
Parliament.179 More recently, however, the Court has held that treaty
rights, which are also within the core of Parliament’s exclusive section
91(24) jurisdiction, are immune from provincial laws that would infringe
them.180 Logically, Aboriginal title should have the same division-ofpowers protection.181
The second protection accorded to Aboriginal land rights in
Canada is found in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which
recognized and affirmed the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada’.182 The Supreme Court has held that this
provision prevents these rights from being unilaterally extinguished, even
by Parliament.183 So, since 1982, extinguishment can only occur
(constitutional amendment aside) with the consent of the Aboriginal
peoples concerned. The Court has nonetheless held that, despite section
35(1), Aboriginal and treaty rights, including land rights, can still be
infringed, provided the test for justifiable infringement laid down in
Sparrow has been met.184 This test requires the government to prove two
things: first, a valid legislative objective for the infringement that is
substantial and compelling; and second, that the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations to the Aboriginal people in question have been respected.
Depending on the circumstances, the second branch of the test can involve
asking the following questions: ‘whether there has been as little
infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a
situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the
aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the
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conservation measures being implemented’.185 Since Sparrow, the
consultation requirement has become a major factor in determining
whether an infringement is justifiable. The Supreme Court has decided
that governments must engage in consultation, and in appropriate
situations accommodate Aboriginal interests, where Aboriginal rights,
though not yet established, are asserted and supported by some
evidence.186 The scope of the consultation depends on the strength of the
case supporting the rights and the seriousness of the infringement.187
While government infringement of Aboriginal land rights is still
possible in Canada, those rights nonetheless have much greater protection
than Indigenous land rights in the United States, Australia and New
Zealand. The addition of section 35(1) to the Canadian Constitution in
1982 took away the parliamentary equivalent of the plenary power that the
US Congress still has over Indian tribes. Unilateral extinguishment has
been barred, so that the kind of termination policy pursued by Congress in
the 1950s cannot occur in Canada.188 Nor can the Canadian Parliament
enact provisions like those in the Native Title Act 1993 and the Foreshore
and Seabed Act 2004 that have extinguished some land rights in Australia
and New Zealand. Even parliamentary infringements of land rights have to
be justified by a stringent test. The duty to consult and to accommodate
asserted Aboriginal rights has also become an effective means for forcing
governments to involve Aboriginal peoples in decision-making, especially
in regard to resource development on their claimed territories. As
consultation must take place with Aboriginal representatives who have the
authority to act on behalf of their peoples, the process of consultation itself
is an exercise of self-government, and a way for Aboriginal peoples to
assert and establish government-to-government relationships.
185
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This discussion has revealed that, despite their common British heritage
and legal traditions, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
have developed divergent legal doctrines in relation to Indigenous land
rights. Differences in the content and requirements for proof of these
rights stem largely from differences in judicial opinion over their source.
In the United States and Canada, the courts have ruled that
occupation is the source of Indigenous title, but the American approach
has distinctly territorial and jurisdictional dimensions, whereas the
Canadian approach is more narrowly proprietary. In the United States,
Indian nations have both residual sovereignty and land rights in the
territories occupied by them. By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court has
determined that Aboriginal title is a property right arising from occupation
of land that is separate from governance rights. And yet the Court has
acknowledged that Aboriginal nations have decision-making authority
over their collectively-held lands, authority one Canadian judge has
concluded is governmental in nature.
In Australia and New Zealand, the courts have decided that
Indigenous land rights stem from the Indigenous legal systems that existed
prior to British acquisition of sovereignty. Through the doctrine of
continuity, these rights became enforceable in common law courts.
Unfortunately, in applying this doctrine the Australian judiciary has
required strict proof that traditional laws and customs confer specific
rights, and that knowledge and observance of the laws and customs have
continued up to the present. These requirements have narrowed the scope
of claimable rights, and imposed impossible burdens of proof on some
Indigenous claimants. In New Zealand, application of the doctrine of
continuity has been less problematic, as land rights stem from tikanga
Māori, broadly defined as including both custom and usage. Nor is proof
of continuous observance of tikanga Māori necessary, except where
required by statute.
The authority of non-Indigenous governments to extinguish or
infringe Indigenous land rights is dependent on a nation-state’s
constitution. In the four jurisdictions examined here, these rights are most
vulnerable to legislative extinguishment and infringement in New Zealand
because the unicameral Parliament has sole authority over them. In the
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United States and Canada, exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indigenous
affairs provides some protection against the states and provinces. In
Australia, federalism also provides some protection against the states, to
the extent that the Commonwealth Parliament legislates in favour of
Indigenous land rights. Only in Canada are land rights generally protected
against legislation by a specific constitutional provision. Ultimately,
however, the fate of Indigenous rights depends on the vision of judges, the
political will of legislators, and a belief within the larger community that
justice requires that these rights be maintained and respected.

